The Overtake That Won't Be

In its renewed environmental review process for the San Francisco to San Jose project, the high-speed rail authority is considering the alternatives for the peninsula rail corridor. The outlines of the new draft EIR are emerging, and this is where politics meets engineering.

Interested stakeholders keep asking about how the blended system will actually work, with Caltrain and high-speed rail sharing the scarce resource that is track capacity. The issue is being studied in some detail behind closed doors by an entity known as the Joint Scheduling Working Group (JSWG), consisting of experts from HSR and Caltrain aided by their respective consultants. As of the end of 2016, the JSWG had produced a first report on its work, which was shaken loose by a public records request from CARRD. Before digging into this, let's take a look back at how we got here.

2012 Blended Operations Analysis (Caltrain/LTK)

While the original four-tracks-all-the-way HSR plan was collapsing in a firestorm of community opposition, Caltrain commissioned a study of blended system operations (8 MB PDF) from consultant LTK Engineering Services, to see if blending Caltrain and HSR primarily on the two existing tracks was viable. The 2012 study concluded that without any additional tracks, the corridor could support up to 6 Caltrain + 2 HSR trains per hour per direction, increasing to 6 Caltrain + 4 HSR with overtake tracks.  Key results were:

• With speeds limited to 79 mph, the most reasonable option with 6 Caltrain + 4 HSR was a "short middle overtake" between Hayward Park (San Mateo) and Whipple Ave (Redwood City).
• A "long middle overtake" all the way through Redwood City provided only marginal performance improvements.

This study legitimized the blended system, which has ever since been the favored approach to bringing HSR to the peninsula rail corridor. The study contained numerous disclaimers to the effect that no official decisions had been made regarding future service levels, programmed overtakes, stopping patterns or scheduled trip times... all the important considerations that feed into a railroad's product, namely its timetable.

2013 Additional Blended Operations Analysis (Caltrain/LTK)

A short while later, LTK published another report (2MB PDF + 14MB Appendices) that can best be characterized as an expansion and refinement of the 2012 analysis, considering additional options. Key results were:

• Unlike the 2012 study, the "long middle overtake" performed significantly better than the "short middle overtake."
• A new option, the "middle 3-track overtake" (between San Mateo and Palo Alto) performed almost as well in simulation, although it assumed all HSR trains entered the corridor on time, unlikely in practice.
• Other overtake track options did not fare as well.

The disclaimers continued, with the conclusions of the study being described as "educational."

2016 Joint Schedule Working Group Report (HSR/SMA)

The key chart in the SMA study
(PDF page 62 / slide 48)

The JSWG was established in April 2016, a while after HSR had engaged the services of Swiss rail consultancy SMA. To avoid a standoff between dueling agencies and consultants, Caltrain/LTK and HSR/SMA are now comparing notes on their respective plans for the blended system. The JSWG's 2016 draft year end report (10 MB PDF) provides important context to the decisions now being made to select a "preferred alternative" for the HSR blended system EIR. This study is interesting for three reasons: it is the first blended system study led by HSR, it offers insight into the evolving ideas of the JSWG, and it is not sugarcoated because it wasn't intended for wide public distribution. Key results were:

• The "no additional passing tracks" case is shown to support 6 Caltrain + 4 HSR per hour per direction, unlike in the LTK studies, provided that headways are tightened and Caltrain passengers don't mind sitting in a siding for 6 or 7 minutes during these overtakes.
• The "short middle 4-track overtake" degrades Caltrain trip times, since overtakes don't naturally tend to occur there.
• The "middle 3-track overtake" performs better than any other option, thanks to allowing bidirectional operation through almost its entire length, unlike in the LTK study where half the length of the overtake track was dedicated to each direction.

Tea Leaf Reading

The grotesque station-in-the-sky
proposed for San Carlos under
the short middle 4-track option

The constant refrain that nothing has been decided yet continues to this day, but the tea leaves are becoming quite readable. Here is some informed speculation:

1. The HSR team really, really doesn't want to build the "short middle 4-track overtake," generally because they have no money and specifically because the SMA analysis has shown this scenario to be a poor performer operationally.
    
2. However, the HSR team is reluctant to withdraw any alternative this late in the preparation of an EIR, after it was carefully introduced to the public through countless outreach meetings, workshops and open houses. Sudden change scares people.
    
3. In order not to build the "short middle 4-track overtake," the HSR team has engineered it into a straw man alternative, using the prospect of grotesquely massive concrete viaducts towering fifty feet over San Carlos and Belmont to strategically elicit vigorous public opposition. It's working, but unbeknownst to them, San Carlos and Belmont have little to worry about.
    
4. Due to having no money, the HSR team strongly favors the "no additional passing tracks" alternative. The mediocrity of the resulting Caltrain timetable, and the amount of time spent by Caltrain passengers waiting to be overtaken, is of little concern to them. But that's okay, since San Carlos and Belmont made them do it.
    
5. The HSR team probably dreads resistance from Caltrain stakeholders who don't want the peninsula rail corridor being taken over to Caltrain's detriment. Strong resistance could force the HSR team to revive the "middle three-track" alternative that had previously been eliminated from the EIR process (see slide 15 in this outreach presentation), setting back the environmental review schedule.
    
6. If the assumptions in the SMA analysis stand up to closer scrutiny, the "middle three-track" scenario could actually be a viable compromise for the blended system. It would no doubt be expensive due to the number of new grade separations, but the result (if one believes SMA) would be fast and robust service for both HSR and Caltrain, with reasonably-sized grade separations in every town from San Mateo to Palo Alto. In the last year, the winds of public opinion have turned more favorable to grade separations in Menlo Park and Palo Alto.

One thing is sure: the "middle three-track" alternative should be added to the HSR EIR and studied in detail, with an eye towards designing the future blended system timetable. The timetable is the product, and it will soon be time to decide on one.

Optimizing the Midline Overtake

The most important piece of infrastructure required for "blending" HSR with Caltrain on the peninsula rail corridor is an overtake facility, basically a several-mile long stretch of up to four tracks that will enable faster trains to overtake slower trains.  Caltrain studies have shown that the best performance (measured by robustness to cascading delays) can be achieved with a midline overtake  from San Mateo all the way through Redwood City.  Preliminary engineering and environmental clearance for this infrastructure is now resuming, with the recent award of a $36 million contract by the CHSRA to engineering firm HNTB.

The baseline configuration for this overtake is described in Caltrain's blended operations analysis, and assumes rebuilt stations at Hayward Park, Hillsdale, Belmont, San Carlos and Redwood City with four tracks and outside platforms in the tried and true style of the 1930s Pennsylvania Railroad. High-speed trains would use the center pair of tracks to overtake slower trains on the outside pair of tracks, as shown below (click figure to enlarge):

For comparison, the figure also shows a better solution that ensures the highest level of punctuality for all trains using the corridor.  This optimized overtake configuration differs from the baseline configuration as follows:

• The slow trains run in the middle, so that disruptions to local commuter service (for example, when an incident blocks a track for hours) do not disrupt high-speed service when commuter trains are re-routed around the incident location.  This track configuration is known as Fast-Slow-Slow-Fast (FSSF) as opposed to the traditional SFFS.  Real world examples of FSSF can be seen in train cab videos from Sweden and Australia.
   
• All commuter stations are built with central island platforms.  This allows commuter trains to use either platform face without confusing passengers, and requires only one set of station amenities (shelters, elevators, escalators, stairs, ticket vending machines, PA systems, train arrival screens, lighting, benches, etc.) because there is only one platform.
   
• A major new interchange station at Redwood City, with four platform tracks and additional train storage sidings.  This station (described below) would serve as a transfer point for HSR, Caltrain and future Dumbarton trains, as well as non-rail transportation modes.
   
• A carefully planned future-proofed high-speed rail junction where the Dumbarton rail corridor meets the peninsula rail corridor, preparing for the inevitable arrival of passenger rail service across the Bay.

Here's how it would ideally play out.

Short Term: the San Mateo Grade Separation

Preliminary rendering of new
Hillsdale station with island platform

The next step in the decadal process of grade separating the peninsula rail corridor will soon begin in San Mateo.  A new $180 million grade separation project is in the final stages of planning for 25th Avenue (currently a grade crossing) as well as 28th and 31st Avenues (currently not connected).  Concurrently with this project, the busy Hillsdale station will be moved a bit north of its current location and turned into an island platform.

This project is caught in an interesting political bind.  There is on one hand a rush to complete it by 2019 before Caltrain's electrification project, to minimize disruptions to Caltrain service.  On the other hand, due to its strategic location, this project will form a key building block of the blended system with HSR, which still needs to be environmentally cleared.  It is a near certainty that this portion of the corridor will require four tracks to enable trains to overtake each other, but any attempt to design and build it as such is likely to run afoul of HSR opponents who will accuse the CHSRA of advancing their project through CEQA piece-mealing.

The southern San Mateo grade separation design will have to be very carefully considered to preserve the ability to add two additional tracks with as little disruption as possible.  Road underpass profiles and bridge abutments should be designed for four tracks, as should the elevated structure that will support the tracks.

The choice of an island platform configuration for the new Hillsdale station is either a sneaky way to build a wide four-track embankment in preparation for yet another new station with SFFS outside platforms, or is an excellent choice for FSSF because it allows future tracks to be added without rebuilding the station for a second time.  One hopes the station access (stairs, ramps, etc.) will be designed to allow the platform height to be raised easily from 8" to 50".  An intelligently designed San Mateo grade separation would atone for the terrible failures of the San Bruno grade separation, designed with great hostility towards higher speeds or additional tracks.

Medium Term: Redwood City HSR Station

Amsterdam Bijlmer (photo by tataAnne)
could just as well be the future
Redwood City train station.

While the CHSRA's plans for a mid-peninsula stop have been shrouded with ambiguity for several years, Redwood City stands out as a more optimal location for a new HSR station than Palo Alto or Mountain View, the other two locations in the running.  Unlike its neighbors to the south, Redwood City favors strong urban growth, has a large amount of railroad land available, and is reasonably well-connected to the existing road and transit network.  Redeveloping the antiquated but popular Sequoia Station shopping center would enable the construction of an elevated four-track station with plenty of capacity to support not just HSR but also Caltrain cross-platform connections and future Dumbarton service.

The station complex would feature two shared (HSR or Caltrain) 400-meter island platforms centered between Broadway and Brewster, easily accessible from both streets.  Bus connections would be conveniently located under the station. To the north of the platforms, a pocket turnback track would allow Dumbarton trains to reverse without fouling other traffic.  Similarly, to the south of the platforms, another pocket turnback track would allow southbound Caltrain locals to terminate in Redwood City before turning northwards again to serve the densely-spaced stations of San Mateo County, allowing Caltrain to serve more passengers with fewer trains and crews.  Thanks to the FSSF configuration, all this to-and-fro by commuter trains would stay well out of the way of HSR.

This would be a large train station and quite a tight fit (if you're curious about exactly how large and how tight, download this KML file into Google Earth to view the station footprint and track layout).  It would be a big change for Redwood City, but with a huge payoff: the tracks would no longer form a barrier through town, and the Sequoia Station shopping center would be merged with the station to form a gateway and a destination in its own right that is connected to downtown.  HSR service could make the city a very desirable location for business.  The new station could become the centerpiece of the ambitious revitalization strategy described in Redwood City's downtown precise plan.  But this idea is not without pitfalls, as the size of the station could be compared to plonking a couple of Nimitz-class aircraft carriers in the middle of town.  To use the tired slogan, it needs to be done right.

Medium Term: a New Fair Oaks Station

Approximate location of new Fair Oaks
station island platform, view to northeast.
Overtake would extend just beyond
platform to the right (south).

The key to reliable overtaking on a multiple-track railroad is to ensure that the average speed of the slower train being overtaken is sufficiently slower than the average speed of the faster overtaking train.  One of the ways of ensuring a good speed differential is to have the slower train make station stops that the faster train doesn't; each station stop is worth about 2.5 minutes.  Therefore, locating stations on the four-track overtake section is helpful.

This brings us to a lemon of a station immediately south of the midline overtake: Atherton.  Located in an area of very sparse population and jobs density, Atherton should be permanently closed.  This closure would come not only as a show of appreciation commensurate with the town's support of Caltrain modernization, but especially because census data shows clearly that Atherton is precisely where you would never place a train station.

To replace Atherton, a new Fair Oaks station should be built just 0.6 miles to the north, at the 5th Avenue grade separation.  The overtake section would be extended a bit southwards, just beyond the station, enabling locals to be passed while stopped at the central island platform that can be accessed from either side of 5th Avenue.  The new Fair Oaks stop would be equidistant from Redwood City and Menlo Park, and located in an area with very high population density that could support thriving ridership, in contrast to Atherton.

Longer Term: a Seamless Dumbarton Connection

Dumbarton rail has been an uncertain prospect for decades, with some political backing but insufficient funding.  While it may take another few decades for the money and the will to finally materialize, large concentrations of employment and the need for additional transbay corridor capacity make some form of passenger rail service inevitable.  The Dumbarton corridor also happens to be ideally suited for high-speed rail.

The key node is Dumbarton Junction, which should be reconfigured in such a way that trains can enter and leave the peninsula rail corridor swiftly and seamlessly.  This will likely involve a flyover track, enabling southbound trains to enter the Dumbarton corridor without crossing (and therefore blocking) any of the northbound tracks.  To minimize the altitude of the flyover, the Rte 84 / Woodside Road overpass would be turned into an underpass.  As for the Redwood City station, the fit would be quite tight with a 90-foot corridor width where the flyover track begins.

While the flyover may seem like an expensive solution to a problem we don't yet have, planning for it now (if not actually building it) will save money in the long run when passenger rail service grows.

Design Values

No matter how the midline overtake is ultimately configured, it must reflect design values that are clearly articulated.  One of these values should be compatibility between Caltrain and HSR.  It's not enough to talk about the "blended system" without actually taking the steps to make the two systems seamlessly interoperable, allowing any train to use any track to serve any platform.  This means no tracks can be dedicated to one operator at the exclusion of another.  Everything must be shared, including the platforms at the new mid-peninsula station.  This sharing contributes to another important value, robustness to service disruptions.  The fast-slow-slow-fast track layout is the key to ensuring that a commuter train delayed in Belmont won't create a statewide domino effect that eventually makes a train late in Los Angeles.  A third important value is future-proofing.  Infrastructure like the midline overtake will define what is possible (and not) for generations to come.  It would be short-sighted not to plan for a fast and seamless connection to the Dumbarton corridor, even if its future use isn't well-defined today.

The midline overtake is the key to an effective blended system.  When evaluating its design, ask yourself: is it compatible?  Is it robust?  Is it future-proof?

Level Boarding: It's Official

A montage of what a Caltrain EMU might
look like, before platforms are raised.
Based on a photo by Yevgeny Gromov

Caltrain just released the final Request For Proposals for their new electric train fleet.  Train manufacturers will now prepare detailed bid packages, and in early 2016 a winner will be selected to build an initial fleet of 15  electric trains that will enter into commuter service in 2021.

Several changes were made to this document after the draft RFP was circulated for industry review.  The single most remarkable change is that level boarding and platform sharing with high-speed rail is now a firm requirement, instead of an option suggested by stakeholders.  These are the words from section 2.2.1.1:

CHSRA trains will run over the same alignment and stop at some of the same stations as JPB trains. The bi-level EMU must therefore have the same interface with the infrastructure as the future High Speed Rail cars, including clearance envelope, and platform boarding height.

JPB plans to raise platform heights to approximately 50.5-50.75” ATOR (to interface with a vehicle threshold height of 51” ATOR), initially at San Francisco, Millbrae, and San Jose stations. Other station platforms on the JPB system may ultimately be raised to the same level.

This is not only an endorsement of level boarding.  It is an endorsement of complete integration with high-speed rail including not just shared tracks but also shared stations.  It is a major step forward for riders and taxpayers, because it will increase the speed, efficiency and usability of Caltrain at the same time as it makes high-speed rail more affordable.  It will help bring to California what Europeans take for granted.

The New Platform Interface

Section 3.3.3 of the RFP details Caltrain's new high platform interface:

• Platform height: 50.5 - 50.75 inches
• Platform side clearance: 72 inches from track center line
• Maximum boarding gap: < 1.5 inches horizontally, < 5/8 inches vertically

Caltrain has entirely dropped the previous plan to implement level boarding at a height of 25 inches, which would not have been compatible with high-speed rail and would have created significant complications in the station infrastructure served by both systems.

Dual Height Doors

The new EMUs will have two sets of doors, not just as an option but as a non-negotiable requirement.  The RFP describes the configuration in section 12:

Each vehicle shall have eight door openings, four on each side of the vehicle, directly across from each other. One set of four shall be located just inboard of the trucks and the other four above the trucks. The set located inboard of the trucks (the low level set) shall be compatible with JPB's existing platform height and existing mini-highs. The set located above the trucks (the high level set) shall be compatible with JPB's future high level platforms.

A large number of bikes (at an 8:1 ratio of seats to bikes) will be stored on the lower level of two cars per train.  They will access the high doors using wheel ramps built into the stairs between the lower bike level and mid level vestibule of the train.

While this is a rather unique configuration, no other train operator worldwide has had to plan for a system-wide platform height transition of more than four feet of vertical change.  For such a large height transition, it makes perfect sense to use the vehicles as a tool to enable the flexible and independent reconfiguration of each individual platform, without imposing system-wide construction schedule or funding constraints.  It is an unusual but quite logical solution to an unusual problem.

The upper set of doors, which will provide level boarding at new high platforms, will feature retractable door threshold extenders, to bridge the gap between the train and the platform.  These are described in section 12.2.12 of the RFP.

Looking Ahead to a Well-Blended System

Caltrain has come a long way on the issue of level boarding and blending with high-speed rail.  A key architectural decision has now been made that will ensure the future success of the blended system.  In the 2020s, Caltrain passengers of all abilities won't give a second thought to the seamless experience of boarding a train, and will take for granted the brevity and punctuality of station stops.  Meanwhile, a few train nerds will photograph the platform interface.

In the meantime, three cheers for compatibility!

Blended Like Oil and Water

The Caltrain-HSR blended proposal, initiated by State Senator Simitian, Congresswoman Eshoo and Assemblymember Gordon to break an impending political impasse on the peninsula rail corridor, has now been evaluated by the HSR Authority's consultants.

Their version of it, submitted in a recent report to the legislature, would cost an astonishing $5.3 billion, even more than the $4.2 billion that the entire peninsula section was estimated to cost back in 2008.  This stunning price tag could have several possible explanations:

1. a repudiation of the blended approach, accomplished by deliberately inflating the budget.
2. an effort to pour the largest possible amount of concrete, regardless of actual operational benefit.
3. sheer engineering incompetence and complete disregard for the new fiscal reality.

A Closer Look At Costs

While the detailed breakdown of that project budget is not provided, it's not too hard to back it out based on what is described.  Here's how it might approximately add up, including project management and contingency costs:

• $0.3 billion to build grade separations at 25th, 28th and 31st Avenues in San Mateo, and to expand the corridor to four tracks from the southern border of San Mateo up to the vicinity of 9th Ave (milepost 18.3), with new four-track stations built at Hillsdale and Hayward Park
• $0.3 billion to expand the existing grade separations in Belmont and San Carlos to four tracks.  This would include new stations built at San Carlos (south of the current location) and Belmont.
• $1.0 billion to fully grade-separate the rail corridor through Redwood City, with expansion to four tracks and an elevated station.  New grade separations would be created at six locations: Whipple, Brewster, Broadway, Maple, Main, and Chestnut.  The new four-track section would tie in to the existing four-track section at Redwood Junction.  Should the Redwood City grade separations be built below grade, costs would be even higher.
• $0.5 billion to burrow a single-track tunnel under the Millbrae station to "save" the existing Caltrain / BART station from complete demolition.  As described in the Alternatives Analysis, the station itself would be re-arranged to accommodate a segregated HSR platform at grade and the southbound Caltrain platform underground.  The tunnel approach would require two new grade separations at Center St. and Santa Paula.
• $1.0 billion to build a six-mile (yes, six miles!) 60-foot tall elevated viaduct from Lawrence Expressway (milepost 40.9) all the way into the upper level of a massive new elevated HSR station complex in San Jose.
• $0.2 billion to demolish existing overpass grade separations at De La Cruz (Santa Clara) and Hedding (San Jose), to be replaced with underpasses to make way for the six-mile viaduct.
• $1.5 billion to electrify the entire corridor, an estimate based on Caltrain's latest electrification budget but discounting the cost of Caltrain's new electric train fleet.
• $0.3 billion for positive train control and technical integration with the HSR system's train control system, which will differ from the PTC solution adopted by Caltrain.
• $0.2 billion for reconfigured station facilities at San Francisco and San Jose.

TOTAL:  $5.3 billion

All of these individual investments must be examined in the context of their operational utility, i.e. the value they add to creating a blended Caltrain / HSR rail corridor that is as flexible and efficient as possible and best meets the service expectation of rail passengers.  And on that basis, most of the above list falls woefully short.

Let's Do Some Value Engineering

• The six-mile (yes, six miles!) 60-foot tall viaduct to approach San Jose adds little operational value compared to cheaper alternatives such as laying additional track at grade from CP Coast (milepost 44.6) into San Jose.  The corridor is mostly 100 feet wide in this area, so the need for a viaduct--let alone a six-mile long viaduct that requires demolishing some perfectly fine grade separations that already exist--is highly questionable.  It is almost an insult to Simitian et al., who specifically requested that aerial structures be minimized.  This viaduct is the outcome of lazy engineering, the sort that avoids inter-agency coordination issues by using megatons of concrete to build over Caltrain, ACE, Amtrak, VTA, BART, UPRR, Caltrans, and everybody else.  Bottom line: with some hard negotiations and minimal takes of a few slivers of industrial property, four tracks can be built at grade all the way into Diridon Station.  Savings: - $1.1 billion
• A four-track mid-peninsula overtake facility is the key enabler of a blended solution. However, the bulk of the cost of this mid-line overtake is a massive Redwood City grade separation project that would eliminate one of the clusters of grade crossings on the peninsula rail corridor.  Is it truly necessary to do so right away in the first phase of the blended project?  Consider these two options:
  1. The CHSRA's proposed overtake facility: 9 miles long with 5 stations (potentially including the HSR stop at Redwood City, which does not help with overtaking)
  2. A somewhat shorter overtake facility: 6.5 miles long ending at Whipple Ave (milepost 24.8) with 4 stations.
  Option 2, while only 3/4 as long, entirely avoids the need to grade-separate an expanded four-track corridor clear through downtown Redwood City.  It also delays a fight against the city's inevitable demands to burrow the rail corridor inside an astronomically expensive tunnel.  The shorter overtake might make operations slightly less flexible and robust, but at the very worst, every Caltrain could be held or slowed for just two minutes to make up for that.  Bottom line: with minor timetable adjustments, the lion's share of the cost of the mid-line overtake can be avoided.  Savings: - $1.0 billion
• The half-billion tunnel in Millbrae is the wrong answer to the question of how to fit four Caltrain / HSR tracks through this station.  The entire Millbrae complex, including 3000-car parking garage, cost about $100 million in today's dollars.  Portions of it can be torn down and reconfigured with four tracks at grade for far less than that sum.  Bottom line: whatever the engineering constraints, you simply don't build a $500 million tunnel to "save" a $100 million station--at worst, you tear it down and start over.  Savings: - $0.4 billion
• The need to integrate Caltrain's CBOSS train control system with the HSR train control system will drive unnecessary costs, most likely resulting in what is known as "dual fitment" of train-borne signaling equipment.  Each high-speed train, California-wide, would need to be fitted with CBOSS hardware and software, with the appropriate interfaces to allow a seamless change-over when entering or leaving exclusive HSR tracks.  This is not a trivial expense, since safety-critical signaling computers approach the cost of aircraft avionics.  Bottom line: deploy ERTMS, not CBOSS.  Savings: - $0.2 billion

TOTAL SAVINGS: $2.7 billion

The very bottom line is this: we can get 95% of the bang for 50% of the buck.  Somebody needs to inject a little bit of sanity into the planning process if a blended solution is ever going to be feasible, if for no other reason that in these times, affordability determines feasibility.  That's why the CHSRA's proposal for the blended system is a disgrace, larded as it is with operationally dubious viaducts, tunnels, bridges and underpasses; in short, a project dreamed up by civil engineers writing their own checks.

Corridor Capacity Study, Free Edition

You may have heard that Caltrain is working on a corridor capacity study, to see how much high-speed rail traffic could be accommodated on the corridor without adding too many passing tracks or destroying commuter service quality.

While we wait for the outcome of this study, below is a decomposition of the problem into a range of possible solutions.


Some solutions have very little downside for HSR or Caltrain service:

• Get HSR off the peninsula corridor as much as possible, by using an Altamont alignment that joins the corridor in Redwood City (see Example 3 for details)
• Electrify the corridor
• Implement level boarding (not even on Caltrain's radar!)
• Put commuter platforms in the middle, with express passing tracks on the outside
• Put in a modern shared signaling system

Other solutions require compromise between the needs of high-speed rail passengers, the needs of commuter passengers, and the needs of surrounding communities.

• Slow down HSR, with lower top speed and all stops (Millbrae and Redwood City) made by all trains
• Close low-traffic Caltrain stations such as Atherton and Hayward Park
• Make peak-hour trains skip more stops-- which unfortunately denies frequent commuter service to communities precisely at the times when it is most needed
• Build additional grade separations wherever four tracks are required
  

Before we make any of these painful compromises, however, the most effective measures that do not require compromising service quality should be prioritized and vigorously pursued.

If one had to bet a six-pack of one's favorite microbrew (worth several orders of magnitude less than LTK Engineering's consulting contract), the outcome of the capacity study is likely to be:

• With 6 Caltrains per hour during the rush, spare capacity available for HSR is minimal on the existing tracks
  
• Capacity can be increased most effectively by matching train average speeds, i.e. slowing down HSR and/or speeding up Caltrain
• HSR trains will probably average no more than 60 mph between SF and SJ
• A mid-line overtake facility between Whipple @ Redwood City and 9th Ave @ San Mateo (requiring minimal new grade separations) would improve peak corridor capacity from 6 to 8 tph

We shall soon find out if we got our money's worth.

Still No Compatibility In Sight

The high-speed rail authority's program management team, of Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, recently published an Operations & Maintenance Concept for peer review by the many foreign HSR operators with which the California High-Speed Rail Authority has signed collaboration agreements.

Besides regurgitating much of the same information already available in the various EIRs and technical memoranda, the peer review document states a number of operational assumptions that have far-reaching implications for the peninsula rail corridor. The first one on the list:

1. The HST system is assumed to operate on dedicated tracks, independent of any other passenger or freight rail services, except in the following locations:

a. Peninsula Corridor – approach tracks leading to the two terminals at Transbay and 4th and King Streets (shared between CHST and Caltrain commuter trains)

Note the added emphasis, that only the approach tracks would be shared, namely north of Brisbane. And then, this:

8. (...) Train operations at the San Francisco end of the network will be complex, linking the two terminal stations, each with mixed HST and commuter traffic, with the San Francisco‐area storage and maintenance yard, as well as the four‐track main line that has high‐speed trains on two dedicated tracks and commuter trains on the other two tracks.

While the document does briefly entertain the alien notion of shared platforms, as well as a "proof-of-payment" fare system where POP must be provided in the paid area of the station (talk about not getting the concept!), what is abundantly clear here is that high-speed rail is being planned on the peninsula without regard to integrating operations with Caltrain--in flagrant disregard of the MOU with Caltrain, and of many successful shared corridors around the world, including even in New Jersey. In this vision, Caltrain is confined to two tracks, and relegated to the role of an operational nuisance on the approach into San Francisco. Any synergy that might arise from Caltrain express trains sharing tracks with high-speed trains is wasted.

Change The Assumptions, Before It's Too Late!

These operating assumptions have dire implications for local commuter rail service on the peninsula.

Caltrain has so far demonstrated a total lack of ambition on the operations front, and has utterly failed, ever since Proposition 1A passed in 2008, to think outside of the two-track box known as Caltrain 2025. There are ways to provide better service with fewer trains, provided that integrated planning is performed up-front by the Peninsula Rail Program, pursuant to the memorandum of understanding (which the above operating assumptions directly contradict).

The high-speed rail program management team is also uninterested, in the first place because their charter is to provide high-speed long-distance service, not commuter service, and secondly, because the same firm built BART. While this can only be alleged, Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas likely has zero interest in improving Caltrain, and every financial interest in receiving another several billion dollars of taxpayer's money to complete BART's manifest destiny to ring the Bay.

Foreign peer reviewers will have little interest in questioning the operational assumptions, since doing so might rock the boat and compromise their future ability to obtain contracts to build and operate California's system.

So just who does that leave to do the right thing, hopefully before any concrete is poured?

Residents and city governments should push hard for Caltrain to integrate its operations with the high-speed rail system, going for maximum flexibility, striking the appropriate balance between local and long-distance services, and enabling the optimal allocation of scarce resources, (such as track capacity at rush hour, platform space at terminal stations, station area footprints in developed areas, etc.) in response to actual demand patterns as they develop. For planning purposes, that means any train should be able to use any track, and stop at any platform.

If peninsula communities are going to bear the considerable disruption of HSR construction and operation, they should have every interest in getting at least a little bit of trickle-down service benefits in return. Otherwise, they may become the rail equivalent of fly-over country.

(thanks to CARRD for obtaining the O&M peer review document)

Peninsula (Northeast) Corridor

It's official: as noted on page 7 of the latest program management team monthly progress report, the selected track arrangement for the peninsula corridor, a key architectural decision with extensive ramifications for Caltrain operations, is slow-fast-fast-slow (SFFS). That means the express tracks will be located in the middle of the right of way, with Caltrain local tracks flanking them on each side. This arrangement is similar to the Northeast Corridor throughout New Jersey (photo at right by theahnman). From the report:

While the June schedule does not show any change in the deliverables dates, in July there will be a change in the delivery of the 15% integration package from September 2010 to October 2010 to change the alignment of the Caltrain tracks to the outside and HST tracks to the inside tracks to reduce the footprint at Caltrain station locations (using side rather than center platforms).

The good news is that the previously-favored, segregated SSFF or FFSS arrangements seem to be off the table. Those arrangements would have prevented the express overtakes that are the key to an effective Caltrain timetable, and would have forced wrong-way movements whenever any one of four tracks went out of service. Wrong-way movements vastly diminish track capacity and exacerbate cascading delays, where one late train makes a mess of the whole timetable--as any regular Caltrain rider knows all too well. So that's the good news.

The bad news is that Caltrain will be stuck with side platforms. When a Caltrain track goes out of service, as it inevitably will, routing trains to the opposite platform will now require cutting across the HSR tracks, as shown in the diagram at left. No more central island platforms, which have undeniable operational advantages as well as simplified passenger access.

Given the choice between giving up island platforms (SFFS) or giving up overtakes (FFSS / SSFF), then SFFS wins by a mile because overtakes are key--but that's really a false choice, constrained by the menu of alternatives. The one alternative that is seemingly not being given due diligence is FSSF.

Their logic might go like this:

1. Caltrain design criteria (Chapter 3, paragraph 1.1.d) and HSR Technical Memo 2.2.4 (Station Platform Geometric Design, section 6.1.3) dictate that platforms must be perfectly straight.
   
   
2. Straight island platforms require a double-reverse curve "wow" around the platform at every station, conflicting with HSR Technical Memo 2.1.2 (Alignment Design Standards for High-Speed Train Operation, section 6.1) that prohibits more than four so-called direction changes per mile.
   
   
3. The reverse curve "wow" beyond each end of the island platform consumes an inordinate amount of land precisely where it is most valuable, in the denser suburban cores where train stations tend to be located.

That's a perfectly logical chain of reasoning, but it is unfortunately based on a poorly conceived requirement that prohibits curved platforms.

As discussed in Football Island, curved platforms allow the "wow" around the center island platform to be much more compact, using barely any more land than the side platform configuration. The diagram at right (do you see the football?) highlights the difference in green, amounting to about a half acre. With the exceedingly generous clearances likely to be used--the diagram shows a mere 75 feet of right of way width!--the difference would be even less. Now imagine a straight island platform, not shown in the diagram, where the green area would need to bulge out over a far greater length; the extra area would amount to the entire area of the platform, 30 x 750 feet or another half acre. That is indeed a waste of valuable land.

Fast-Slow-Slow-Fast isn't some far-fetched concept. It works in Sweden, and it would work here, far more efficiently and flexibly than a carbon copy of the Northeast Corridor. Why not give a careful second thought to curved platforms, unencumbered by rote compliance with ill-considered specification requirements?

Strange Bedfellows Indeed

The June 2nd CHSRA Operations Committee meeting audio recording included some interesting information that was neither in the agenda nor in the PowerPoint slides, regarding the relationship between Caltrain and the CHSRA.

The True Meaning of Track Sharing

The following exchange took place between Rod Diridon, board member of the CHSRA, and Tony Daniels, the program manager for the entire technical effort--a sort of godfather figure of the HSR project. They had been discussing and praising Caltrain's recently obtained FRA waiver, which allows Caltrain to operate European-style electric trains provided that certain conditions are met. Here's where the discussion went next:

Diridon: The joint track waiver that FRA is going to be giving now to Caltrain, is for them to use diesel and electric, their electric, not our vehicles, on their track.

Daniels: Right. Compliant and non-compliant is the best way to look at it.

Diridon: I understand. But to be more graphic here, it's the difference between using diesel locomotives and the lighter European or Asian type electric powered vehicles.

Daniels: Only for passengers. No freight.

Diridon: For passenger service, on the same track.

Daniels: Not freight.

Diridon: Right, and of course that assumes positive train control.

Daniels: Yeah.

Diridon: Have we thought about using their tracks for our … locomotives, or…

Daniels: We are. We are doing it…

Diridon: I meant their double-track system for our system.

Daniels: We are doing it.

Pourvahidi: Instead of our tracks, instead of having our tracks?

Diridon: No, I don't see in our alternatives any place…

Daniels: No no just, sorry, (…) it's not that we can't run on it, we can, if it was necessary, in the same way as the Caltrain trains can run on ours, our so-called tracks. It's just that there's not the capacity.

Diridon: Well I understand capacity.

Daniels: Right. But you can't work on either. We're planning to keep them separated except when you come in from Bayshore into 4th & King and ultimately Transbay, we have to mix ourselves on the track. As we go into Transbay, for example, we'll use the same track going in.

Diridon: Though we certainly wouldn't prefer it. But if we were stuck along the peninsula someplace with no more than a two-track system, … have you thought about that?

Daniels: Uhhh, it would change completely the whole plan. Right now, we're kind of…

Diridon: I'm not proposing it. Don't misunderstand me.

Daniels: We looked at it operationally, at 60,000 feet, and just… we're talking 22 trains an hour. That's not on, you can't turn around.

Diridon: You mean at maximum, there's 22 trains an hour. Not to begin with.

Daneils: No, but ultimately, when you're starting, you're going to be on the order of something like 18 trains an hour. Then you've got to turn them around at the other end. That's where the difficulty is, not running them on the tracks.

Diridon: You're talking about Caltrain now?

Daniels: Yeah. You can't turn that number of trains around at the terminal end.

The key nugget is highlighted in red. Despite Caltrain's dogged insistence to the contrary, the CHSRA does not, repeat, DOES NOT, plan to share tracks with Caltrain on the peninsula. Their plan is to have their own pair of exclusive-use tracks all the way up to Bayshore. Those HSR tracks could only be "shared" by Caltrain under rare circumstances when another track is out of service--a sort of breakdown lane, and certainly not a mixed-use corridor that would allow Caltrain to provide both frequent AND fast service.

This can and should be construed as a downright rape of Caltrain. HSR is going to be brutishly rammed up the peninsula corridor without due regard to the enormous benefits that a truly shared corridor could provide for peninsula commuters--whether they ride the train or drive.

Keep Your Hands Off My Stimulus

Another interesting exchange occurred regarding the $2.3 billion of federal stimulus funding that the FRA has awarded to California. As noted repeatedly at the operations committee meeting, the late 2011 deadline for stimulus funding is extremely tight, with environmental clearance (a.k.a "shovel readiness") of the peninsula high-speed rail project unlikely to be obtained, let alone litigated. Sensing the possibility that this time-critical federal funding could slip away to other parts of the state, the Bay Area congressional delegation is supporting Caltrain's effort to jockey for some of the HSR bacon.

Diridon: Also, when would be an appropriate time to talk about the impact of the attempt by the Caltrain system to acquire ARRA funds directly.

(…)

Daniels: I think that's a separate matter for the authority, I think, to try and resolve what… is Steve Schnaidt [legislative affairs consultant] here? Because he brought this up as an item that we need to try and resolve, because there is some conflict between what the peninsula wishes to do and what we're doing on the high-speed rail, and that has not been cleaned up yet, I don't think.

Diridon: Can I ask a further question there, sorry to take so much time. [Friendly banter about Diridon taking so much time.] It seems to me that the environmental clearances that the Caltrain system has, that they want to fund, are based on a Caltrain type of service.

Daniels: That's right.

Diridon: Not on a four-track system.

Daniels: Correct.

Diridon: As a consequence, if you're talking about attempting to use ARRA funds to do their electrification on a two-track system, or to do grade separations on a two-track system, it's counter-productive to our objectives. Is that not a factual statement?

Daniels: It is and it isn't. It's not a black-and-white answer. I mean you could structure it, if you could do it under the environmental, our high-speed rail environmental process, it would help ultimately the building of our piece of it. You could state it that way, but …

Diridon: I absolutely understand that we could meld their clearance into ours and modify their clearance to include a four-track system instead of a two-track system or elevated or whatever ours is going to be. But the clearance that they have now, that they're trying to rely upon in order to qualify for ARRA funds directly, is based on a two-track system--on-grade, two-track system--which may not be what comes out of our study.

Daniels: It's very unlikely it will. We will be, we know already from everything we're doing that it's a four-track system to make it work for both sets of operations, commuter and high-speed rail.

Diridon: So, at some point Mr. Chairman we need to have a conversation on this subject. Because if ARRA funds go in to build for example an undercrossing for a two-track system, we then come along at a point in the future with a four-track system, that has to be accommodated by the undercrossing, we have to rebuild the undercrossing. That's the worst kind of government. We don't want to be tearing up brand new projects in order to change something.

Daniels: Well here's the answer to that movie, Rod. The question that we raised right at the beginning of them having some guidance from the FRA about how we're going to put these ARRA funds together will include whether we can or cannot do what you've said. On first glance, I don't think you can, because the ARRA funds are supposed to be for high-speed trains, and a two-track commuter line is not a high-speed train.

Let the games begin. As a clarification, Caltrain board has not actually certified the electrification EIR just yet. That action, unexpectedly held up last April, is reportedly slated for early July.

A Compromise Solution?

One of the many strings attached by FRA to their Caltrain waiver is that positive train control must be installed, tested, and FRA-certified before Caltrain can carry even a single passenger on an electric train. That puts PTC in the critical path. Unfortunately, Caltrain's PTC plans do not jive with high-speed rail's PTC plans. That lack of jive makes it exceedingly unlikely that ARRA high-speed rail money will be allowed to fund Caltrain's PTC project. In these lean times, just where is Caltrain going to find $230 million (opening bid!) to build something that's incompatible with high-speed rail?

A far better approach would be to grant Caltrain some ARRA money to become the first installation of ERTMS in the United States, blazing the path for high-speed rail. Everybody wins: Caltrain gets a lower-risk, timely PTC solution with funding to back it up--and HSR gets the bureaucracy of importing and tailoring ERTMS taken care of early, a state-wide benefit that is far from a parochial peninsula interest. With a viable PTC program in place, it might even make sense to start thinking of funding some Caltrain electrification infrastructure--infrastructure that would be quite useless without PTC. See the Catch-22?

When you're in a hole, the first thing to do is stop digging.