High Voltage Rule Making

25,000-volt alternating current overhead electrification, the worldwide standard for powering modern passenger trains as now planned for Caltrain and the statewide high-speed rail system, currently does not exist anywhere in California. Nor do any regulations exist to ensure its safe and reliable implementation. That's why the California High-Speed Rail Authority and its consultants have successfully petitioned the California Public Utilities Commission for a new regulatory framework to enable the use of 25 kV technology in California.

In concert with the CPUC, a committee of HSR technocrats has developed a proposed General Order to regulate important topics such as:

• Performance requirements
• Clearances and protection against electric shock
• Grounding and bonding
• Strength requirements
• Safe working practices
• Incident reporting

The rule-making proceeding can be found under CPUC docket number R1303009.  The proposed draft regulatory document (2.3 MB PDF, known as a "General Order" or GO) can be found under CPUC petition docket number P1210011.  A close reading of this proposed GO reveals two fundamental flaws that seem to have entirely escaped the authors:

1. The draft GO proposes to regulate 25 kV overhead electrification specifically for the operation of high speed trains.  The authors commit a fundamental category error by treating 25 kV electrification as a technology that is unique to 200+ mph high-speed rail, which is flat out wrong.  25 kV electrification is a world-wide standard technology used for powering any type of train, from commuter to freight to intercity to high-speed rail.  Examples abound, even within the United States, and could someday find their way to California--let's say for example, the San Francisco peninsula.  California regulations should not preclude any of these other applications just because they were authored by and for the HSR project.  The GO should regulate 25 kV AC electrification as a general category for powering electric railroads, and treat the specific application to high-speed rail as a sub-category.  The draft document should be entirely re-structured, with HSR relegated to a chapter that covers only those special regulations that pertain solely to high-speed operations.
    
2. The draft document does not read like a concise regulatory document, and instead includes numerous pages of technical guidelines and best practices quoted nearly verbatim from the CHSRA's own technical specifications.  Much of the draft is descriptive material that speaks of the HSR system in the future tense.  The authors seem to have made no effort to separate descriptive material and run-of-the-mill engineering requirements from the key regulatory (safety) requirements, and the result is an unorganized mess of a kitchen sink that reads as if a committee of technocrats had authored it.  Which they apparently did.

You might think that someone close to the matter would say something about these obvious flaws, but all that Caltrain could muster as a response (under P12100011) is this:

Based on our prior coordination with the CHSRA and discussions with California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) staff, the following is our understanding:

• The CHSRA Petition and proposed GO broadly describes the statewide high-speed rail system to include "shared use corridors"; 

• The reference to "shared use corridors" would include the Caltrain corridor, which is in the SF to SJ segment of the CHSRA blended statewide system; 

• The GO would potentially be applicable to the Caltrain electrification project, to be led by the PCJPB; and 

• The Caltrain electrification project will require specific regulatory consideration of the effect of 25 kV ac power lines upon signal predictors for at-grade crossings, which may require JPB to seek its own GO or to request an amendment to the GO being proposed by CHSRA. 

In other words, Caltrain politely requests to be considered as part of the HSR system so that whatever (really, whatever!) regulations of 25 kV electrification, as drafted by the CHSRA and its consultants, can "potentially" become applicable to Caltrain's own electrification project.  They couldn't get any more passive than this.

It is becoming clear that our rail agencies and state regulators are falling all over themselves in their incompetence to craft a logical regulatory framework around a mature world-standard technology.

Lynn Schenk Is Right

Lynn Schenk, vice chair of the California High-Speed Rail Authority, caused a stir today when her refusal to vote for the latest Caltrain / HSR memorandum of understanding left plans for the "blended" system stuck in neutral--at least until she is outvoted at the next board meeting.

She contends that the blended system isn't high-speed rail and shouldn't be paid for using HSR bond funds.  And she's right: nowhere else in the world does anyone seriously propose "blending" a new high-speed rail system with commuter rail over such a long distance as the 50 miles between San Francisco and San Jose.  That's a recipe for limited speeds, bunched commuter trains, and cascading delays.  It could rightly be considered a diversion of HSR funds from their intended purpose.

If you want SF to LA in 2 hours and 40 minutes, the simple truth is that blending should be kept to a strict minimum, like this:


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The Virtues of Width

The Swiss rail vehicle manufacturer Stadler was recently awarded a contract for 112 bilevel EMU cars to be delivered by 2016 for the Moscow airport express, based on their modular KISS vehicle concept.  A rendering is shown at right, complete with retro-Soviet hood ornament.  These EMUs are noteworthy because they take full advantage of the generous Russian loading gauge (the available height and width clearances), resulting in two spacious levels of passenger seating, and also because they use high platforms.  This is a European EMU on steroids, and Caltrain should take notice.

In a blended HSR + Caltrain system, slowly transitioning to full grade separation over a time scale of decades, several constraints exist that will impede Caltrain's ability to add capacity to meet increasing ridership demand:

• More trains per hour won't work.  Because there are only two shared tracks, the capacity of the corridor (as measured in trains per hour) is limited.  It's going to be a stretch for Caltrain to operate six trains per hour per direction with HSR in the mix, so adding more is clearly out of the question until the much-dreaded additional tracks are built.
   
• Longer trains won't work.  Train length is limited at stations such as Burlingame and Menlo Park, where grade crossings are found at both ends of the station platforms.  Until these locations are grade-separated and new longer platforms are built, adding more cars to make longer trains is not feasible.  In any case, most Caltrain platforms limit train lengths to 600 feet (or 7 standard-length cars), at least until they are rebuilt.
   
• Taller trains won't work.  Today's bi-level trains already take good advantage of the available height, so there is no seating capacity to be gained by growing trains any taller.

Loading gauge comparison,
Russia / USA / Europe

If more, longer, or taller trains can't satisfy increasing ridership, why not give wider trains a try?  The Russian 1-T loading gauge, shown at right in comparison to the loading gauges of western Europe and Caltrain, allows trains that are almost six inches wider than ours.  Going even a few inches wider than the Russian limit, with a 134-inch wide car shell, would enable five-abreast seating at the same level of comfort offered in Caltrain's existing Bombardier cars.

The Advantages of Extra-Wide EMUs

The diagram below shows a cross section of three double-deck trains: a traditional European EMU of the sort coveted by Caltrain; a Caltrain Baby Bullet car; and a hypothetical extra-wide EMU with comfortable five abreast seating, a few inches wider than the Russian model described above.

Such an extra-wide EMU has several advantages.

• More passengers per train.  With five abreast seating, 15 to 20% more seating can be provided without increasing train length or train frequency.  Even in those areas without seats, more floor space is available for standees.
   
• More usable space.  Extra width makes for more spacious and comfortable vestibules, stairs, and passageways between cars.  High-traffic areas near doors, bicycle racks, restrooms, and luggage racks do not impede the flow of passengers.
    
• Lower crew costs.  The number of conductors required on a train is dependent on the number of cars in the train.  Under the present labor agreement, there is a strong incentive to keep train lengths to six cars and to maximize passenger capacity per car.  Five-abreast seating reduces the crew cost (and other operating costs) per available seat.
   
• Future-proof HSR compatibility.  Because the CHSRA has already settled on a single-level train architecture for its high-speed trains, it is likely that similar capacity limitations will drive the future California trains to be extra-wide, like the Japanese Shinkansen or the Russian Velaro.  Converting Caltrain to a wider standard helps achieve future platform interface compatibility with HSR, which is not just a matter of height but also of width.
   
• Easier conversion to high platforms.  Wider trains can be fitted with both high and low doors to accommodate a platform transition period, without cutting as badly into the seat count as for a normal size train.  (The Russian example is built exclusively for high platforms, but more doors could be added on the lower level.)  What's more, with high platforms built further away from the tracks, those annoying freight trains get a little bit more clearance.
    
• Easier vehicle packaging.  From an engineering standpoint, modern EMUs are like a jigsaw puzzle where every vehicle component must find its place under multiple constraints.  More width gives vehicle designers more flexibility to make everything fit, making trains more comfortable and maintainable.

There is very little downside to going wide.  Caltrain's EMUs would be a captive fleet on the peninsula rail corridor, such that expanding a few inches outside the AAR Plate F loading gauge would require only minimal infrastructure modification and would not impede interoperability.  Stadler has once again demonstrated that the car body shells of a modular vehicle can be tailored to any desired size, using different extruded aluminum shapes.

Caltrain should make full use of the generous clearances available on the peninsula corridor.  In a blended future where HSR limits the number of peak-hour commuter trains, extra-wide EMUs with five-abreast seating are an attractive solution for giving Caltrain more rush-hour capacity.

The Blend, HSR Style

The California High-Speed Rail Authority recently published a memo (requested by Kathy Hamilton and CARRD) justifying the oft-questioned claim that the Phase 1 "blended system" presented in the 2012 Business Plan is consistent with the trip-time requirements built into section 2704.09 of Proposition 1A, the HSR bond.  The trip times are in the bond language to prevent funds from being disbursed for projects that are not high-speed rail.

The memo states that the blended system will enable 30 minute non-stop trip times between San Francisco and San Jose.  In support of this claim, the memo provides the speed graph below, to which blue annotations have been added for clarification.  The annotations are necessary because the memo authors evidently did not go out of their way to explain the graph to non-engineers.

San Francisco to San Jose (southbound) speed versus distance graph, annotated.
Notches in the speed profile represent curve speed restrictions.

An independent calculation of the speed profile (using the output of a Train Performance Calculator that numerically integrates the differential equations of motion of the train, taking into account traction, braking, and drag forces) shows that an AGV train limited to 110 mph can travel from San Francisco 4th & King to San Jose in 33 minutes, under a slightly different set of assumptions where the train is slowed by a curve at Palo Alto, uses the existing 45 mph San Jose station approach, and makes an actual stop in San Jose.  After the differing assumptions are reconciled, the math does check out and the calculations are correct.

Those Pesky Assumptions

As for any computer simulation, the results are predicated on a set of input assumptions.  As the saying goes, "garbage in, garbage out"--bad assumptions will lead to bad results.  While the CHSRA's time of 30:22 is reasonable under the particular assumptions they made, the assumptions themselves are questionable.  They include:

1. The train starts from San Francisco 4th & King, not Transbay.  Starting from Transbay, with its notoriously slow approach, would add about another 3 minutes.
2. No Caltrain service is allowed for, or in their words, "Caltrain train service will allow for high-speed express train to run unimpeded between SF and SJ".  In Caltrain's blended operations analysis, all HSR services during rush hour make a two-minute stop at Millbrae, which has the effect of reducing the speed differential between HSR and Caltrain.  If HSR were to attempt a 30-minute run during rush hour, it is likely that Caltrain would be impacted by reduced rush hour track capacity, from six Caltrains per hour per direction to four or five.  The stop at Millbrae adds 3.5 minutes to the SF-SJ run.  Such is the nature of compromise.
3. No padding is included.  In the real world, timetables include a small amount of padding (5 to 7 percent) to allow for the occasional unplanned delay.  Over a half-hour SF - SJ run, a real-world timetable would add at least 1.5 minutes.
4. The train does not stop in San Jose, so no penalty is taken for the time lost as it slows down.  This alone is worth at least half a minute from 75 mph.
5. The train uses the least energy-efficient, pedal-to-the-metal driving style.  Brakes are applied fully and at the last moment, and acceleration is at full throttle.  In the real world, where energy and maintenance do cost money, a smoother and more energy-efficient traction and braking profile would add about 1 minute.
6. No speed restriction is present at Palo Alto, where a double reverse curve limits train speeds to 90 mph.  Slowing from 110 mph would add about 20 seconds.
7. The train approaches San Jose on an elevated viaduct leading into the proposed upper level at San Jose Diridon, maintaining a speed of 75 mph (as opposed to the slower 45 mph limit practiced on the existing alignment).
8. Timetables show departure times.  Departure from San Jose would be two minutes after arrival.

In the real world, all those assumptions add up.  In a blended scenario at rush hour, if a passenger picks up the HSR timetable, entries for SF Transbay and San Jose will be no less than 42 minutes apart (30.5 minutes express run time + 3.5 minutes Millbrae stop + 3 minutes Transbay + 1.5 minutes padding + 1 minute energy efficiency + 0.5 minutes slowing for San Jose + 2 minutes dwell at San Jose.)

While a special one-time midnight Cannonball Express run could be achieved in 30 minutes and 22 seconds without violating any speed limits or laws of physics, this figure is not operationally feasible in everyday service and boils down to nothing more than a stunt.  Under the same stunt assumptions, a decrepit old Caltrain diesel could rush from SF to SJ in just 39 minutes.

As the HSR project is litigated, the distinction between a one-time high-speed stunt and a robust every-day train timetable will be important to keep in mind.

Keep Out the Coast Daylight

The Coast Daylight pulling into
Palo Alto in 1942.  Image from
paloaltohistory.com

Caltrans recently published an administrative draft of its California State Rail Plan. This document assembles hundreds of pages of assorted kitchen-sink gobbledygook, fails to mention important topics such as level boarding even once, and reveals a strange fixation with Amtrak's plans to start a new Coast Daylight train linking San Francisco with Los Angeles.

The Coast Daylight, as any old railroader will tell you, was one of the Southern Pacific's most prestigious services back in the golden age of steam trains. The red, black and orange livery of the massive GS-class locomotives (shown in the opening photo pulling into Palo Alto in 1942) is sufficient to throw even the most staid rail buff into convulsions of nostalgia, which seems the likeliest explanation for the sudden urge to resurrect this long-forgotten train.

Why should we care about this anachronism? As it turns out, this latter-day Coast Daylight would terminate at Fourth and King in San Francisco, causing a number of complications and constraints for modernizing the peninsula rail corridor.

Chronic Lateness.  The Coast Daylight's counterpart, the Coast Starlight, has the well-earned nickname "Coast Starlate."  Because the Daylight would also use hundreds of miles of track owned by freight railroads and subject to all sorts of delays, the northbound Daylight would be exceedingly unlikely to arrive reliably on time, causing it to miss its assigned timetable slot on the peninsula rail corridor and delaying everybody else.  With track capacity in the blended Caltrain / HSR system a scarce and valuable commodity, one must ask, should all passengers (especially those who value their time and use high-speed rail) have to pay for Amtrak's inability to keep to a timetable?

Diesels Forever.  The Coast Daylight would be a diesel train, and as the State Rail Plan notes, it could not use San Francisco's new underground Transbay Transit Center station where diesel exhaust is not allowed for.  This would strand it on the surface at the 4th and King station, which is increasingly becoming the object of San Francisco's desire for urban redevelopment.  Plans for Amtrak trains to San Francisco clearly clash with San Francisco's plans for the surface rail yard, a clash that wouldn't arise with 100% below-ground electric trains.

Yet Another Platform Interface.  The Coast Daylight would presumably use the same equipment as other Amtrak long-distance trains, with an entry floor height of 17.5 inches.  No matter what floor height Caltrain ultimately selects for the necessary upgrade to level boarding, Caltrain platforms will end up higher than this.  Because steps down from the platform into a train aren't allowed under ADA and FRA regulations, the result would be separate platform tracks entirely dedicated to the Coast Daylight at San Francisco, Millbrae and Redwood City--or no level boarding for Caltrain.  That hardly seems like optimal use of expensive station facilities.

Negative Return on Investment.  Thanks to speedy and frequent service, the lucrative San Francisco - Los Angeles travel market will go mostly to HSR, with only marginal ridership left to the Coast Daylight to pick up in coastal communities in between.  The Coast Daylight will join many other Amtrak long-distance trains with subsidies per passenger well above the price of a ticket.  The opportunity cost of every dollar spent on reviving the Coast Daylight means that rail service will languish in areas with far greater potential.

Yet Another Tenant Railroad.  Caltrain's plans for modernized train control (known as CBOSS) make a big deal of accommodating so-called "tenant railroads" that travel over Caltrain-owned tracks.  While the Coast Daylight has indeed been accounted for by the Diesel Brain Trust, the very real possibility that CBOSS might fail and get replaced with the HSR train control system could make integration of the blended system unnecessarily difficult.

Blending different services on shared and limited rail corridor infrastructure is a good idea in principle, but blending can go too far.  Amtrak is the spice that will make this blend go sour.  The Coast Daylight should terminate in San Jose or Emeryville, and even nostalgic rail buffs must accept that Amtrak should keep out of the peninsula rail corridor.