Is Demand-Based Planning a Myth?

Original photo by qviri

With over 80% of riders using Caltrain to commute to their jobs during rush hour, one would think that the service would be planned around where people live and where people work, using cold hard numbers from the census.  That's known as traditional demand-based planning: provide service where the most people will use it.  It's not rocket science, and demand-based planning is used all around the world to plan excellent rail service.

But not here on the peninsula.

In a contrarian argument made circa 2005, Caltrain's operations staff claimed that demand-based planning is a myth. (14 Mb PDF file)   At the time, Caltrain was crowing to its industry peers about the success of the Baby Bullet.  The keys to success included "Questioning Traditional Planning Processes" and "Trusting Your Intuition".  Numbers don't matter, just go with your gut!

In the years since, there has been plenty of hard evidence that the Baby Bullet has severely reduced ridership at many locations, especially in Santa Clara County.  Indeed, data from the 2010 census can be correlated to the latest Caltrain ridership data without ever looking at a timetable to reflect quite accurately which Caltrain stops are under-served and falling short of their ridership potential.

Maybe demand-based planning isn't such a myth after all.  Maybe numbers don't lie.  Here's hoping that objective, quantitative metrics will play a central role in planning future blended operation scenarios with high-speed rail.  This stuff is too important to trust anybody's intuition.

U.S. Supplier Enters ERTMS Market

In a move that amounts to a clear acknowledgement of the increasing worldwide supremacy of the ERTMS ("European" Railway Traffic Management System) technology standard, General Electric Transportation Systems recently became the first U.S. signaling supplier to enter the ERTMS market.

GE Transportation Systems is the same company slated to supply the on-board and wayside components of CBOSS, Caltrain's new-fangled train control system that will be paid for with HSR funding while being technically incompatible with the HSR train control system.

One could briefly entertain the illusion that common sense might prevail, and that with a minimum of contractual upheaval CBOSS could evolve into the first U.S. installation of ERTMS, a solution that could eventually be extended to the entire California HSR system.  Unfortunately, in the blinkered world of parochial agency interests, spending money (over $200 million of it for SF - SJ alone!) is a higher aspiration than providing a good technical solution.  Compatibility is for sissies; why do it right when you can do it twice?

Primarily Two Tracks

Figure 4 from Caltrain's study, showing several possible locations for new overtake tracks.  Not all would be built.

In recent days, the high-speed rail Draft Revised 2012 Business Plan as well as the Caltrain Blended Operations Analysis were released to the public.  Both of these documents refer to the peninsula blended solution as a "primarily two-track" system, in the hope of allaying fears of massive eminent domain takings of homes and business-- fears that are largely unfounded, but fanned relentlessly by the local press and project opponents.

The confusion continues over what "primarily two tracks" precisely means, because neither agency seems ready to come out yet and state it in crystal clear terms.  The process still needs to unfold.  Luckily, enough data has already been published to allow a reasonably good reading of the tea leaves, down to the nearest tenth of a mile.

Phase 1 will be electrification, according to the memorandum of understanding currently being put in place by MTC and other parties.  This project already has federal environmental clearance and is very close to state environmental clearance, although a strong push will be made by opponents to subsume Caltrain's electrification EIR into the peninsula HSR project EIR, a document that will not be finalized (let alone litigated!) until 2015.  This phase of the project will not add any tracks, so the total length of quadruple track will stay as it is today (2 miles in Brisbane; 1 mile in Redwood City; 2 miles in Sunnyvale).

• Purpose: improves Caltrain, enables future peninsula HSR
• Time frame: 2013 - 2019
• Total miles of quadruple track: 5
• Grade-separated fraction: 61% (64 of 104 road crossings)
• Trains per peak hour per direction: 6
• Cities impacted by construction: none

Phase 2 will be a concrete viaduct through Santa Clara, completed at the same time as HSR reaches San Jose sometime in the mid-2020's, enabling a one-seat ride to San Francisco under the so-called "Bay-to-Basin" scenario.  If the CHSRA's grandiose plans (described in an October 2011 report to the legislature) are to be believed, this will entail building a massive double-decker station complex at San Jose.  A new four-track HSR station will hulk over the existing Diridon Station, perched on massive concrete straddle bents.  A more than 3-mile-long, 60-foot-tall viaduct will be constructed northwards, joining the existing corridor at approximately milepost 44.5, north of the Santa Clara Caltrain station.  Overpasses at Hedding and De La Cruz will be demolished and rebuilt as underpasses to make room for the new double-deck rail right of way.  Note that Caltrain's study considers this phase as part of the "baseline infrastructure" and therefore does not count it as additional tracks.

• Purpose: enable single-seat HSR ride to San Francisco
• Time frame: mid 2020's
• Total miles of quadruple track: 8
• Grade-separated fraction: 61% (64 of 104 road crossings) 
  
• Trains per peak hour per direction: 8 (6 Caltrain + 2 HSR)
• Cities impacted by construction: Santa Clara

Phase 3 will be the "short" mid-line overtake from 9th Ave in San Mateo (milepost 18.3) to Whipple Ave in Redwood City (milepost 24.8), which enables HSR service to increase from 2 to 4 trains per hour during the peak.  The data tables in Caltrain's study show that this overtake facility provides nearly all the benefits of the "full" mid-line overtake that extends southwards through Redwood City, but presumably at far lower cost.  The transportation-industrial complex's approach to the short mid-line overtake might very well entail demolishing the entire Belmont - San Carlos grade separation and replacing it with a four-track viaduct on concrete stilts.  A more realistic implementation will likely be to tack on another 15 feet of width on each side of the existing grade separations to accommodate new overtake tracks, something that should have been done in 1999 (but why do it right when you can do it twice?).  In San Mateo, new four-track grade separations will be built at 25th, 28th and 31st Avenues.

• Purpose: increases HSR peak capacity from 2 to 4 trains per hour per direction
• Time frame: late 2020's
• Total miles of quadruple track: 14.5
• Grade-separated fraction: 63% (67 of 106 road crossings) 
  
• Trains per peak hour per direction: 10 (6 Caltrain + 4 HSR)
• Cities impacted by construction: San Mateo, Belmont, San Carlos

Phase 4 will be the "full" mid-line overtake, also known as the Great Redwood City Grade Separation, creating a new mid-peninsula HSR stop at Redwood City and grade-separating a dense cluster of six grade crossings.  The four-track mid-line overtake will be extended southwards to milepost 26.3, merging with the existing four-track section.

• Purpose: adds mid-peninsula HSR stop
• Time frame: late 2020's
• Total miles of quadruple track: 16
• Grade-separated fraction: 69% (73 of 106 road crossings) 
  
• Trains per peak hour per direction: 10 (6 Caltrain + 4 HSR)
• Cities impacted by construction: Redwood City 

Beyond that, it gets murkier.  Presumably, the 33 remaining grade crossings that are not removed under Phases 1 - 4 will be addressed on a case-by-case basis, with grade separations designed and built in consultation with the respective cities.  San Francisco's downtown extension to the Transbay Transit Center may finally be built.  Additional passing tracks may be constructed where it's relatively easy and cheap, for example the remaining 2.5 miles from Lawrence to Santa Clara and the "north overtake" in Caltrain's study, an additional 8.2 miles of quadruple track from Brisbane south into Burlingame.

Only one thing is quite certain: the peninsula rail corridor will categorically NOT remain a two-track operation, even if it might still use "primarily" two tracks.  At a minimum, approximately 16 miles or over a third of its length will be quadruple-tracked.  As the process unfolds, it will become apparent that the cities of Belmont, Redwood City, San Carlos, San Mateo and Santa Clara will be the first to suffer the construction impacts.

The Hybrid DMU, Unicorn of the Rails

The hybrid DMU is a diesel multiple-unit train with a twist: it has on-board energy storage to enable energy recovery, similar to an electric train that feeds power back into the grid when slowing down.  Just as in a hybrid automobile, this energy store helps to start the train rolling again, and reduces energy consumption in stop-and-go operations.  Peninsula cities and stakeholders, ever more astute on rail matters, perceive three important benefits in the hybrid DMU:

1. It keeps high-speed rail out.  In discussions of Caltrain electrification and the slow beating-around-the-bush process that is leading up to the certification of the electrification EIR, high-speed rail has become the central issue. Electrification is viewed in some quarters as the camel's nose under the tent, so a renewed push is underway to ensure that all the alternatives other than electrification have been duly considered.
    
2. It keeps unsightly high-voltage poles and wiring at bay, preserving views and presumably residential property values in some of the most affluent areas in the nation.
    
3. It spares Caltrain, the perennially funding-starved agency, the burden of spending $785 million of scarce capital dollars to string wires over its tracks.

The hybrid DMU is viewed as a synergistic technology that solves all three issues in one fell swoop, in a classic Silicon Valley win-win-win.

There's only one little problem: it doesn't really exist.

Okay, almost.  There do exist a handful of hybrid DMUs in Japan.  These advanced technology trains, instantly knowable to any city staffer via a simple Google search (keyword hint: 'hybrid DMU'), operate in Japan.  The fleet numbers three cars on one line, and ten cars spread among four other lines.  Each car seats about 45 and tops out at 60 mph.  Their power output is less than a Chevy Tahoe hybrid's.

The Law of Diesel Trains

To understand why the hybrid DMU will never work for the peninsula corridor, look no further than the laws of physics.  What Caltrain needs is a singular focus on better service: quicker trips, more frequent stops, higher capacity, and less waiting for the next train.  That requires big, fast trains with one key quality: punchy acceleration, precisely the reason why the EMU (electric multiple unit) powered by high-voltage overhead lines was invented and perfected.  To achieve high acceleration, the laws of physics dictate high power and low weight.

A diesel train makes all its power on board and sends it to electric motors that drive the wheels; it is essentially a rolling mini power plant.  The nicest and newest rolling mini power plants used by Caltrain today generate 3,600 horsepower for a million-pound train.  In metric units, that's about 6 kW/ton, and as any Caltrain rider can attest, it doesn't exactly pin you to your seat.  The problem is that rolling mini power plants are heavy, and if you want more power, you'll need to haul around even more weight.  This is the Law of Diesel Trains, directly derived from Newton's Laws of Motion.  More weight does little to help with acceleration, so diesel basically can't scale up.

The EMU, on the other hand, doesn't schlep around a rolling mini power plant.  Its electricity is generated off-board by a real power plant, of the PG&E variety.  The electric grid, hooked up to gigawatts of generating capacity, can provide essentially limitless power to a train.  That endows a typical EMU (of the sort available off-the-shelf from many manufacturers) with a power-to-weight ratio of about 12 kW/ton, or double the giddy-up of a diesel train.  For short bursts of acceleration, high-voltage EMUs can briefly exceed their continuous power rating and draw even more power, hitting up to 18 kW/ton.  For those still keeping track, that's triple the acceleration of Caltrain.  For reference, BART cars achieve a respectable 15 kW/ton.

So what do the Japanese know about hybrid DMUs that we don't?  Most importantly, they do not claim zippy acceleration as a benefit.  The hybrid DMU does three things for them: save about 10% on fuel, cut down nitrous oxide emissions, and cut the noise of an idling train down to an electric whisper. Beyond those benefits, the 'D' in DMU makes it follow the Law of Diesel Trains.  The Japanese hybrid DMUs manage barely 5 kW/ton, probably because they haul around not just a mini power plant, but also big heavy batteries.  Here in the US, more stringent crashworthiness standards would make such trains even heavier and their performance even more anemic.

The inescapable conclusions are thus:

• Hybrid DMUs provide only about one third of the acceleration required to enable meaningful Caltrain service improvements. A simple technical litmus test for future Caltrain rolling stock is the power-to-weight ratio, required to be at least 12 to 15 kW/ton.  Hybrid DMUs don't qualify.
• Hybrid DMU technology has never been scaled up beyond the size of a bus.
• Hybrid DMU technology inherently cannot be scaled up to achieve higher power-to-weight and acceleration in large (600 - 1000 passenger) configurations.

The mystical powers ascribed to hybrid DMUs by peninsula stakeholders rightfully earns them the nickname of 'Unicorn of the Rails.'  It's time for them to realize that by undermining the choice of EMU technology and promoting hybrid DMUs, they are also undermining the future of Caltrain--intentionally or not.  Caltrain can be faulted for many things, but their choice of high-voltage EMU technology as the path to modernization is unequivocally correct and technically justified, regardless of what happens with high-speed rail.

Will BART Bust a Move?

The unfortunate reality of Bay Area transit politics is that twenty-eight agencies compete for funding and ridership with very limited coordination.   At the top of this pile is BART, the biggest of them all.  Not so much BART the transit operator, but BART the expansion-thirsty transit-industrial complex (functioning somewhat like the military-industrial complex), as facilitated by the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC).  (photo at right by cplbasilisk, modified with permission)

With recent developments in the peninsula high-speed rail story, it's worth taking a step back and imagining BART / MTC's next moves in this slow-motion game of political chess, assuming for a moment the following motivations:

• Expand as much as possible, constructing the most new infrastructure in the most corridors using the most consultant engineering and "craft hours" of construction labor
• Soak up as much federal, state and local funding as possible
• Take over high-ridership corridors, even at the expense of other agencies
• Ring the San Francisco Bay with BART, as initially planned in the 1950s

The resulting exercise can either be viewed as a crackpot conspiracy theory, or as a simple thought experiment rooted in recent history.  Where MTC and BART have successfully assembled billions of dollars for the Millbrae/SFO and San Jose/Santa Clara extensions, Caltrain has repeatedly floundered: no downtown extension, no electrification, no Dumbarton rail, and the list goes on and on...  Supposing this historical pattern were to be sustained, what specifically would be BART's logical next moves?

Move #1: Drop Support For Pacheco HSR.

The long-running Pacheco-Altamont controversy over the Bay Area HSR alignment, still simmering in the courts, is driven on one hand by not-in-my-backyard sentiment in communities impacted by the Pacheco alignment (notably Palo Alto, Menlo Park, and Atherton) and on the other hand by transit activists who argue that the Altamont alignment makes far more technical sense to serve the immediate transportation needs of the Bay Area in a coordinated and sustainable way.

BART and MTC were firmly in the Pacheco camp because of the need to preserve for BART a key piece of rail right of way between Fremont and San Jose (the former Western Pacific line, purchased by VTA in 2002).  This right of way would almost certainly have been claimed by HSR under any reasonable Altamont scenario.  Worse, a blended HSR/commuter rail project could have undermined the very purpose and need for BART in that corridor.

Today, this concern has been overcome by events, and the BART extension to San Jose is a done deal.  Pacheco HSR no longer plays a role in defending this important BART turf, and thus may no longer garner the same level of support from BART and MTC as it once did.



Move #2: Promote Altamont HSR with a BART Connection at Livermore.

The BART board recently approved a more detailed study of a future extension to Livermore, along I-580.  While this extension is a waste of money on its own merits (as are most BART extensions), and is still far from becoming reality, it could be sold as a key enabler for a phased implementation of HSR, especially under a budget-constrained environment.

Livermore as a BART-HSR transfer point has been considered before, if only discreetly, as part of the half-hearted "Altamont overlay" that the CHSRA has been studying in addition to the baseline Pacheco Pass alignment--always with the insistent disclaimer that the Altamont corridor serves a completely different "purpose and need" than the high-speed rail project.  Meanwhile, MTC suggested as recently as 2007 that HSR terminate at Livermore BART, absorbing all HSR ridership into BART (see comment L017-8).

As an interim phasing opportunity, Livermore BART would actually work quite well:

• Earlier and quicker HSR service to downtown San Francisco and the greater Bay Area
• Earlier and quicker HSR service to Sacramento (quicker than the Amtrak Capitols)
• Cheaper construction with less tunneling to achieve "Bay-to-Basin" connectivity

The Livermore BART extension would be routed south along Vasco Rd. or Greenville Rd., past the Laboratory, to terminate just south of Livermore at a new BART/HSR interchange station on the outskirts of town.  This station would be located on an Altamont HSR alignment proposed by outside groups but studiously ignored by the CHSRA.  This Altamont HSR route is known as the SETEC alignment, after the French HSR consulting firm that performed the preliminary engineering.  The SETEC alignment is noteworthy in that it avoids major residential property impacts to Livermore and Pleasanton, one of the main arguments used by the CHSRA to select Pacheco in the environmental study process.

Here is a rough point-by-point comparison of Altamont/Livermore and Pacheco/Gilroy interim scenarios:

	Altamont HSR to Livermore	Pacheco HSR to Gilroy
HSR Trip Time, from Fresno	0:48 Fresno - Livermore	0:39 Fresno - Gilroy
Continuing Trip to San Francisco	0:57 on BART Livermore to Embarcadero	1:45 on Caltrain Gilroy to SF (electrified)
Fresno - San Francisco CBD	~ 2:00 (40 minutes quicker) including transfers	~ 2:40 including transfers
Fresno - Oakland	~ 1:50 (50 minutes quicker)	~ 2:40
Fresno - San Jose	~ 1:50 (10 minutes slower) assumes BART to SJ	~ 1:40
HSR Track Length	140 miles (25 miles more)	115 miles
Phase 2 HSR to Reach Sacramento	60 miles (50 miles less)	110 miles
HSR Tunnel Length (interim)	about 4 miles (6 miles less)	about 10 miles

Using the money saved by tunneling only 4 miles to Livermore instead of 10 miles to Gilroy, the additional 25 miles of track to reach Livermore are easily paid for-- and then some, since 50 miles of track will already have been built to reach Sacramento, as opposed to zero for Pacheco.

Move #3: Dangle the Carrot of a PAMPA Subway.

The Palo Alto Weekly recently published an article headlined "Four-track design back on the table for high-speed rail," apparently implying that it was once off the table.  That seems to be the crux of a major disconnect between the city and the high-speed rail Authority.  The blended Caltrain / HSR plan, as proposed in recent months by Simitian-Eshoo-Gordon and currently being analyzed by Caltrain, was always viewed by the CHSRA as an intermediate phase, a stepping stone to the immutable objective of a four-track high-speed railroad through PAMPA (Palo Alto - Menlo Park - Atherton).  This viewpoint is borne out in the 2012 draft business plan.  Palo Alto, on the other hand, views the blended plan as a final state of the peninsula rail corridor for the foreseeable future, and believes that the four-track plan should no longer even appear in the program EIR.

BART's best move here is again to promote Altamont HSR.  For PAMPA, the advantages are thus:

• No four-track HSR grade separations, ever
• No additional right of way (a.k.a. eminent domain) needed, ever
• No HSR traffic on top of commuter rail traffic (only 6 trains per hour per direction)
• Future opportunity for a two-track BART subway, considerably cheaper to construct than a four-track high-speed corridor.  A two-track BART tunnel box is four to five times smaller, in cross-sectional area, than a four-track HSR tunnel box.  This makes it remotely feasible to have the cities participate in the financing of a subway, much as was done in Berkeley in the 1960s, to further enhance property values.

For BART itself, the main advantage of Altamont is of course to preserve the future possibility of ringing the bay by connecting Santa Clara BART to Millbrae BART.  The argument that BART can make in pleading this case is that all existing infrastructure north of Millbrae (i.e. fresh grade separations in San Bruno, and existing tunnels to San Francisco) would be dedicated exclusively to HSR, thus mitigating the astronomical cost of accommodating Caltrain detailed in the 2012 business plan.

As billions of dollars slowly coalesce for a possible blended HSR / Caltrain plan on the peninsula, time will become pressing for BART to bust a move.  If the motives that underlie the above narrative are remotely true, then any attempt to electrify the peninsula corridor shall be thwarted, just the same as it has been in past decades.