MOU, Part Deux

Back in April, the CHSRA and the Peninsula Corridor JPB (also known as Caltrain) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding that laid out a sparse outline for collaboration between the two agencies on the peninsula HSR project. This MOU is not a binding contract, since it can be canceled by either party upon 30 days notice, but it provides an increasingly detailed framework for agreement--so long as it lasts. A new MOU amendment, approved by the CHSRA on October 1st and likely to come before the PCJPB in November, is just as interesting to read as the newly released preliminary alternatives analysis that has drawn most of the media's attention.

A New Organizational Structure

The joint project, known as the Peninsula Rail Program, is structured as shown in the organizational chart at right.

The PRP director, Caltrain's Bob Doty, reports 50 - 50 to the respective chief executive officers, Mike Scanlon at Caltrain and Mehdi Morshed at CHSRA. A horizontal relationship is envisioned between Doty and Tony Daniels, the CHSRA's statewide program manager. That places Dom Spaethling, the CHSRA's regional manager, one tier below alongside the PRP discipline managers. The HNTB team that is currently doing most of the preliminary engineering and environmental work, under Tim Cobb and John Litzinger, reports to Spaethling and not to the PRP director.

The dual reporting structure, embedded deep into the hierarchy, will be challenging to manage whenever the differing needs of high-speed rail and Caltrain come into opposition, as they surely will. The 15 or so people represented by blue boxes will have their work cut out for them when the two agencies don't see eye to eye. While the MOU does not indicate how labor costs are burdened with overhead, the PRP director is listed on page 13 at $547,413 per year, with an average of $392,331 per year for PRP personnel. When the going gets tough, they will have to prove that their mettle at least matches their financial compensation. [UPDATE 10/5: it turns out that the labor figures are about 3.5x the salary paid to the employees. For example, the director makes about $170k per year.]

Five Focus Areas

Under the PRP director, the program is organized into five major functions, each of which is assigned FTE (full-time equivalent) personnel as listed below. Each functional area is further described in pp. 7-11 of the amended MOU.

• Engineering (infrastructure, rolling stock, systems) - 3 FTE
  
• Operations planning - 2.4 FTE
  
• Project controls & contracts administration - 3 FTE
  
• Program management / administration - 2.3 FTE
  
• Public participation and community involvement - 1 FTE
  

It is refreshing to see operations planning staffed to nearly the same level as engineering. Operations planning can establish early on how best to provide efficient and integrated service on the peninsula, which drives all the ancillary questions of engineering such as the choice of rolling stock or the number of tracks required in each location. Operations should drive engineering, and not the other way around--as is sadly and often the case throughout the history of Bay Area rail transportation projects. Work smarter, not harder.

Clash Of The Standards?

The amended MOU includes the following statement:

Until an operator for CHSRA has been identified, PCJPB will provide engineering standards developed by and for the Peninsula corridor, which must be compatible with Caltrain and HSR.

Caltrain's extensive library of engineering standards will continue to rule on the peninsula, despite a growing collection of closely held technical standards, memoranda and directive drawings produced by Parsons Brinckerhoff to ensure statewide technical compatibility and interoperability among all sections of the high-speed rail system.

Caltrain will need to evolve its standards to attempt a complicated feat, without precedent in the United States: the gradual transition from legacy diesel trains to the modern, lightweight electric trains commonly seen in Europe and Japan. Do they have what it takes?

Another Lawsuit Brewing

Update 8/11/09: The lawsuit (full text, 4.3 MB PDF) has now been filed in San Mateo County Superior Court, amid a certain degree of pageantry.

Original Post: Another lawsuit is brewing at the ground zero of legal action against high speed rail on the peninsula, the leafy town of Atherton. It isn't the first, and will surely not be the last.

Famously, the town of Atherton is the lead plaintiff in a lawsuit that seeks to overturn the CHSRA's program environmental certification, which settled upon a route that traverses Atherton via the Caltrain corridor. That lawsuit is scheduled to be decided later this month.

On August 5th, the Daily Post revealed in an article that Atherton Menlo Park resident Russell Peterson and his attorney Mike Brady are planning a new lawsuit to prevent any HSR construction from occurring without full compliance under the Union Pacific trackage rights agreement. In November 1991, when the peninsula rail corridor was sold by the Southern Pacific to the Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (the operator of Caltrain), the Southern Pacific (later merged into the Union Pacific Railroad) retained certain rights pertaining to rail operations on the peninsula corridor. See Freight on the Peninsula for an overview of UPRR's peninsula operations.

Quite aside from the unanswered questions of exactly who is going to be sued, on what grounds, and whether Peterson even has legal standing to enforce an agreement to which he is not a party, the lawsuit will seek to enlist UPRR's purported rights to slow or stop the construction of high speed rail on the peninsula and through Atherton. Peterson may be trying to provoke UPRR into a dispute with the PCJPB over the high speed rail issue, triggering the Dispute Resolution and Binding Arbitration clauses of Section 7 of the agreement.

Brady, the attorney, spoke at the April 2nd Caltrain board meeting, opposing the Memorandum of Understanding that the PCJPB entered into on that day. That MOU established a framework of cooperation between Caltrain and the California High Speed Rail Authority, which Brady and other project opponents felt was in violation of the 1991 trackage rights agreement. The minutes of that meeting record his statement as follows:

Mike Brady, Menlo Park, said UP has written four letters to HSR over the years concerning its rights under the Trackage Rights Agreement. He is challenging the legal rights of the JPB to enter into this contract with HSR in light of the existing contract with UP. The JPB represents the citizens of San Mateo County and attention needs to be paid to the detrimental impact of HSR and steps need to be taken to alleviate it.

So what's all the fuss about anyway? HSR opponents have made much of the fact that the UPRR agreement contains a clause giving the Union Pacific the right to operate intercity passenger service, as opposed to Caltrain's commuter service. Section 2.7 of the agreement delineates the respective rights and responsibilities of the User (UPRR) and Owner (Caltrain).

2.7 Intercity Passenger Rights Agreement: Intercity Passenger Service on the Joint Facilities (except for User's Cahill/Lick Line) shall be subject to the following provisions:

(a) Owner shall permit User to allow NRPC [Amtrak] Intercity Passenger Service Trains to be operated over the Joint Facilities (except for User's Cahill/Lick Line) in accordance with the terms of the NRPC Agreement in effect as of the date of this Agreement with the understanding that any changes subsequent to the date of this Agreement in Intercity Passenger Service, including but not limited to the number or schedule of Trains, shall be subject to Owner's consent under section 2.7(b) hereof.

(b) User may amend its present or any subsequent NRPC Agreement and enter into any new agreements and amendments thereto with NRPC or with any other party for the provision of Intercity Passenger Service over the Joint Facilities (except User's Cahill/Lick Line) with the consent of Owner, which shall not be unreasonably withheld, subject to the provisions of Section 4.3 when Owner dispatches and controls the operations and provided that costs due to any such Intercity Passenger Service agreement, or amendment thereto over the Joint Facilities (except for User's Cahill/Lick Line) and costs of changes necessitated by such agreements affecting line capacity, yard capacity, or the signal system shall be borne by the User. The parties agree to negotiate in good faith with regard to any additional parties that may be engaged or User proposes to have engaged in Intercity Passenger Service.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 2.7(b) above, no Intercity Passenger Service Trains shall operate on Exclusive Commute Trackage without a written agreement between Owner and User.

While it will take lawyers to comb through this and other clauses, Section 8.3.c of the agreement is particularly interesting. This section was likely written to allow for a future BART takeover of the peninsula corridor, in accordance with BART's original plans, but might equally apply to the current plans for the peninsula.

8.3.(c) In the event that Owner demonstrates a reasonably certain need to commence construction on all or substantially all the length of the Joint Facilities (including User's Cahill/Lick Line) of a transportation system that is a significant change in the method of delivery of Commuter Service which would be incompatible with Freight Service on the Joint Facilities (other than User's Cahill/Lick Line), Owner may, at its sole cost and expense, file no sooner than nine months prior to the commencement of such construction for permission from the ICC to abandon the Freight Service over the portion of the Join Facilities (excluding User's Cahill/Lick Line) upon which the construction is to occur. User shall not object to or oppose such a filing; however, it shall be allowed to participate in the abandonment proceedings.

Given that Caltrain's plans for lightweight electric trains on a shared HSR corridor would potentially qualify as a "significant change" that is "incompatible" with UPRR freight trains, the PCJPB and CHSRA could conceivably kick UPRR off the peninsula corridor if they wanted to. (However, all signs so far point towards accommodation of UPRR and its freight customers.) In view of the low level of freight service and the strong nationwide push for HSR, it is unlikely that the federal government would oppose or deny such a radical move, if it ever became necessary.

With that ace in play, can Russell Peterson succeed in provoking UPRR to take a hard stance on the trackage rights agreement?

Baby Bullet: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?

In June 2004, after a period of falling ridership and revenue, Caltrain began operating a limited-stop express service, known as the Baby Bullet. Express trains used newly installed passing tracks in Sunnyvale and Brisbane to overtake slower local trains (as illustrated in the photo at right by Dan Klitzing). The start of Baby Bullet service marked a turning point for Caltrain, with weekday ridership rocketing from 25,000 to about 40,000 and farebox recovery ratio increasing to the mid-forties.

It was a welcome change to see Caltrain's transformation from a plodding public transit operator to a more strategic, business-oriented organization putting passenger service first. As evident in ridership statistics, Baby Bullet express trains consistently score the highest passenger load factors and are the greatest source of fare revenue for Caltrain.

Meanwhile, the California High Speed Rail Authority intends to transform the peninsula corridor into a four-track operation, with the slow pair of tracks shared by Caltrain locals and freight trains, and the fast pair of tracks shared by Caltrain expresses and high speed trains. The Memorandum of Understanding signed in April 2009 between the CHSRA and the Peninsula Corridor JPB (Caltrain) envisions "mixed traffic from Caltrain commuter rail and the high speed train service capable of operation on all tracks".

What exactly does that mean for Baby Bullet service?

Some Numbers To Connect

• 31% of ridership: Baby Bullets are Caltrain's highest-revenue trains, accounting for 31% of weekday ridership but only 22% of trains. There is a demonstrated market for rapid commutes along the peninsula. Will a private HSR operator attempt to cherry-pick this market away from Caltrain, leaving the publicly-funded agency on the hook to operate less profitable local trains?
  
  
• 4.8 million passengers: The CHSRA is under great pressure to show that its business plan "pencils out" and will allow funding of system extensions (to Sacramento and San Diego) partially through revenue bonds. The Authority estimates in its ridership and revenue forecasts that by 2030, 3.7 to 4.8 million passengers a year will ride HSR between peninsula destinations (San Francisco, Millbrae, Redwood City / Palo Alto and San Jose), accounting for about 9% of the entire system's ridership, and 2% of its fare revenue. That level of intra-peninsula ridership amounts to nearly half of Caltrain's entire 2008 ridership. Does this imply HSR intends to take over Caltrain's express commuter service and associated revenue?
  
  
• 9 or 10 tph: According to the same ridership and revenue forecast, which serves as the foundation for the analysis of design alternatives, the peninsula corridor will be sized for a traffic of 9 or 10 high speed trains per hour, each way, by the year 2030. When all trains travel at the same speed, a pair of tracks can support about 20 tph each way, but when speeds differ (as they might between HSR and express commuter trains) the capacity can drop into the low teens. With little spare capacity assumed for express commuter trains, will the CHSRA conclude that sharing tracks is not beneficial after all?
  
  
• 2'1" platforms: The CHSRA and Caltrain have so far shown no intention of coordinating on the crucial issue of platform height. Quite the contrary, details emerging from the Transbay Transit Center project in San Francisco indicate that the two systems will operate with different and incompatible platform heights (3'6" for HSR and 2'1" for Caltrain--a difference of two steps). The implication is that high speed trains will be unable to use Caltrain platforms, and vice versa. Will this restrict the number of locations where express commuter service can be provided?
  
  

• 2 dedicated tracks: The environmental impact work in southern California is a bit more advanced than on the peninsula, and a design alternatives analysis has already been released for the Los Angeles to Orange County section. (By the way, we should see one for the peninsula before 2009 is out... that's when the can of worms officially gets opened!) The LA - Anaheim route is similar to the peninsula in that it will have a mix of HSR and commuter traffic. The CHSRA analyzed several scenarios involving mixed commuter - HSR operation, and rejected them all in favor of dedicated tracks for HSR, stating on pages 36 and 37 that "the Dedicated HST Alternative was identified as the only alternative capable of accommodating the peak demand forecast for all classes of train service at acceptable levels and on-time performance." In other words, commuter trains can't be allowed to gum up the HSR timetable. In case there was any remaining doubt, they really drive it home: the dedicated alternative "provides for a safer environment (no mixing of FRA-Compliant and Non-Compliant trains), and does not require a waiver from the FRA." The result is a train-size Jersey barrier between the high speed tracks and lesser trains, as shown in the figure at right. Will the same, unimaginative "Dedicated HST" logic be applied on the peninsula?
  
  
• More than 4 tracks: Before the wording of the MOU between the CHSRA and Caltrain was altered, it stated that the peninsula corridor would be four tracks wide and that "In some places the corridor may consist of more than four tracks." Does this amount to leaving the door open for the possibility that HSR tracks could be completely segregated from Caltrain, with additional tracks (beyond four) as required to operate express commuter service?
  
  
• 70 minutes: If Caltrain service were operated by electric multiple-unit (EMU) trains, an all-stops local would need 70 minutes to travel between San Francisco and San Jose. (Refer to a presentation describing Caltrain's Project 2025, made by their "Rail Transformation Chief" Bob Doty last September: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3) While this is much faster than 91 minutes achieved by diesel locals today, it is still 13 minutes slower than today's best Baby Bullet timing of 57 minutes. Express service will be needed even with the fanciest EMU technology if today's run times are to be preserved, let alone improved upon. Might Caltrain settle on 70 minutes as "good enough"?
  
  
• 9 board members: The nine-member board that governs Caltrain is composed of appointed county officials with little knowledge of rail operations and greater allegiance to the interests of their home county than to the specific interests of Caltrain. In practice and through no fault of their own, their accountability to current or potential commuters is limited to little more than good will and personal dedication. Furthermore, funding sources for Caltrain are unreliable. In political clout or financial wherewithal, the PCJPB is far outclassed by the CHSRA. Supposing they tried, could Caltrain protect its own interests with much vigor? Will the CHSRA wave the electrification bill over their heads to get whatever they want?
  
  
• 30 days: while the MOU signed between the CHSRA and Caltrain envisions "mixed traffic from Caltrain commuter rail and the high speed train service capable of operation on all tracks," either party can unilaterally cancel the MOU upon 30 days' notice.
  
  
• Zero: the CHSRA's desire to navigate the byzantine process to obtain from the Federal Railroad Administration a "mixed operations waiver" is likely zero. Such a waiver would be required if HSR service were operated on the same tracks as heavy trains that are fully "compliant" with FRA crash safety regulations. Caltrain is taking the lead on this complicated issue and making good progress, but what if this effort falters? Will the lazy answer be dedicated HSR tracks, strictly off-limits to Caltrain?
  

Implications for Peninsula Commuters

One doesn't need to wear a tinfoil hat to view the above points as possibly suggesting a "Dedicated HST" scenario on the peninsula corridor, with high speed trains operated entirely separately and independently from Caltrain. Why would this be bad for peninsula commuters?

• There would be no flexibility in adapting the stopping pattern of express trains to actual demand. If express service were taken over by HSR, the intermediate stops would be Millbrae and Redwood City / Palo Alto, due to platform incompatibility. Need to get from San Mateo to Mountain View in a hurry? Today, there's the Baby Bullet. Tomorrow? Forget about it and take the local.
  
  
• The opportunity to create transfers between local and express commuter service, across a common platform, would be lost. The HSR tracks would occupy a large portion of the right of way, making it difficult to create a four-track, cross-platform commuter interchange station. Cross-platform transfers are extremely useful in creating feeders for express service and cutting journey times even for riders who do not live or work near an express stop.
  
  
• Any spare capacity of the HSR tracks, such as might result if the ridership forecast was optimistic, would be wasted since it could not be taken up by other services such as express commuter trains.
  
  
• Incidents (e.g. suicides) would cause more disruption and reduce operational flexibility, since commuter / HSR trains could not use each other's tracks to circumvent the location of the incident. "Single-tracking" around an incident is far more disruptive to a timetable than detouring four tracks into three, as would be possible in a shared-track scenario.
  
  
• A common fare system where a single fare covers the trip from point A to point B, regardless of the transit operator or speed of service, would be less likely.
  

Anyone who cares about flexible and efficient express commuter service--regardless of who provides it--should hope that shared HSR / Caltrain operations on the peninsula corridor aren't just empty talk. Making it happen will require more coordination and possible regulatory complication, but failing that, the Baby Bullet's days may be numbered.

Memorandum of Understanding

The California High Speed Rail Authority recently added to its website the text of a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that will soon be signed with the Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (PCJPB, a.k.a. Caltrain).

This document, hammered out by the two parties, establishes an "initial organizational framework" whereby the PCJPB and CHSRA become partners in the planning, design and construction of improvements to the Caltrain corridor. The CHSRA already approved it at their March 5th board meeting; approval by the Caltrain board of directors is expected at their next meeting on April 2nd.

The MOU lays out some key points of understanding:

• A new Program Director, reporting to both the Caltrain and HSR executive directors (Michael Scanlon and Carrie Pourvahidi, respectively) will coordinate and oversee the work of the staffs and engineering consultants of the two parties.
  
• Caltrain will continue to operate during HSR construction.
• The needs of Caltrain must be considered, including the ability to operate 8 trains per hour in each direction (as already set forth in the Caltrain 2025 plan).
  
• The peninsula corridor and all existing improvements belong solely to the PCJPB.
  

The MOU is also interesting for what it does not spell out:

• How and to what extent will the two organizations (governing boards & staff) be integrated?
• Who will pay for what?
• Who will be liable for what?
• Who will own what, after the project is completed?

The MOU states that all these things will be planned. As the saying goes, "the planning will continue until we find out why no decisions have been made."